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We investigate the impact of relaxing listing requirements on firms’ growth around 
initial public offerings (IPOs). Japan experienced several deregulations of listing 
requirements in the late 1990s. We use a dataset that covers both public and private 
firms for more than 30 years, which enables us to compare the firms’ operating growth 
around IPOs as well as to compare the growth under both strict and relaxed listing 
requirements. When comparing the matched firms, we find that IPO firms’ excess 
growth in profitability and productivity diminished after their IPOs, while their excess 
growth in terms of size (measured by sales and number of employees) still increased in 
the post-IPO period. This finding indicates that relaxing listing requirements enables 
high-growth firms to go public but does not lead to subsequent growth in productivity 
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Policymakers expect that relaxing listing requirements or building new stock exchanges will help firms to 
grow through initial public offerings (IPOs). In addition, IPO firms are expected to contribute to economic 
development through innovation and job creation. For these reasons, several stock exchanges relax the listing 
standards of existing markets or create new markets for start-ups to provide opportunities to raise capital.1 In the 
US, although it is not a new stock exchange, the Jumpstart Our Business Start-ups (JOBS) Act, which allows 
growing private companies to raise capital investments, was enacted in 2012.2 
The objective of this paper is to examine whether relaxing listing requirements can really help firms to grow 
through IPOs. Previous literature has investigated the change in operating performance around IPOs and finds 
that performance increases before IPOs and declines after IPOs (Jain and Kini, 1994; Chemmanur et al., 2009 
and the others). However, little is known about the effect of relaxing listing requirements on firms’ performance 
around IPOs. To examine this effect, we compare the excess growth, which is the difference between the 
growth of IPO firms and that of matching firms based on the propensity score, around the deregulations. As 
proxies for firms’ growth, we employ three types of measurements: (1) productivity (total factor productivity, 
TFP), (2) profitability (operating profit), and (3) firm size, which is measured by sales and number of 
employees. 
This paper uses a Japanese dataset to examine the impact of relaxing listing standards on IPO firms’ growth 
for the following two reasons. First, several deregulations were enacted in the Japanese IPO markets during the 
late 1990s, including a relaxing of the listing standards for existing stock exchanges and the establishment of 
new stock exchanges for emerging companies. This setting enables us to understand the impact of going public 
on subsequent operating performance in two different listing environments: pre- and post-deregulation. Second, 
                                                 
1 For instance, the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) was established in 1995 as an alternative stock exchange to the Unlisted 
Securities Market (USM) in the UK. In Singapore, Catalist was established in 2007, and in China, Venture Board, an emerging market 
for start-ups, was established by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2009. 





our data provide financial information not only for public firms but also for private firms over a period of more 
than 30 years, which enables us to examine the impact of deregulation by comparing growth rates pre- and post- 
deregulation. In Japan, private firms with more than 500 shareholders and more than 10 million yen (or 
approximately 100,000 US dollars) of public equity issued, and private firms with more than 100 million yen of 
private equity issued, are required to file with the Ministry of Finance. Nikkei Media Marketing collects these 
filings. Furthermore, this dataset enables us to compare IPO firms with private firms because Nikkei Media 
Marketing collects the accounting reports posted by large private firms that are not required to file. 
Using data on public and private firms for a long period, we find the following results. First, we examine 
how the firms that are planning to go public differ from other private firms. We compare firms’ growth at three 
years prior to an IPO and other private firms that do not go public within the next ten years. We find that pre-
IPO firms’ productivity and profitability are higher than those of other private firms in both the pre- and post-
deregulation periods, suggesting that  firms with higher productivity or profitability generally go public in both 
the pre- and post-deregulation periods. We also find that the standard deviation of profitability is higher in the 
post-deregulation period than that in the pre-deregulation period. This implies that relaxing listing requirements 
enables not only low-profit firm but also potentially growing firms to go public.  
When comparing the firms’ size, we find that firms in the pre-deregulation period are larger than private 
firms but, in the post-deregulation period, they are smaller than private firms. This indicates that several 
deregulations enable smaller firms to go public. Furthermore, the standard deviation of firms’ size increases in 
the post-deregulation period, indicating that a variety of firms is able to go public due to the relaxed listing 
standards. Overall, these findings show that deregulations dramatically change the characteristics of IPO firms. 
Second, we investigate excess growth around IPOs. The results differ among the growth measures. 
Regarding firms’ productivity and profitability, the findings reveal that productivity and profitability increase in 
the pre-IPO period and decrease in post-IPO period. In contrast, the growth of a firm’s size increases in both the 
pre- and post-IPO periods. These results are consistent with the previous literature that focuses on the growth 
around IPOs (Clementi, 2002; Spiegel and Tookes, 2008). 
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Lastly, as the main purpose of this paper, we investigate whether the excess growth changes after serial 
deregulations. Regarding the impact of deregulations, there are two predictions. One is that relaxing listing 
requirements enables low-quality firms to go public and that post-deregulation growth is lower than that during 
the pre-deregulation period. On the other hand, the second prediction is that relaxing listing requirements 
enables potentially growing firms that could not do so during the period of strict listing requirements to go 
public. Growth in the post-deregulation period is then higher than that in the pre-deregulation period. Regarding 
productivity and profitability, we find that firms listed in the post-deregulation period report higher growth 
before going public than those in the pre-deregulation period. However, the higher growth rate in terms of 
profitability and productivity diminishes after a firm goes public, which is consistent with the theoretical 
arguments by Clementi (2002) and Spiegel and Tookes (2008) as well as the recent empirical results of 
Bernstein (2015) and Asker et al. (2014), who argue that going public harms the strength of an IPO firm. In 
contrast, regarding size measurements, we find that firms in the post-deregulation period grow more both before 
and after IPOs than in the pre-deregulation period. The results are observed in two size measurements, sales and 
employment, which indicates that, although excess productivity or profitability growth diminishes, going public 
contributes to job creation.  
Our article attempts to bridge two streams of literature concerning the IPO, the first of which analyzes the 
influence of the IPO market relaxing listing standards, while the second analyzes firms’ operating growth 
around IPOs. First, this paper is related to studies that examine the impact of the listing standard and firms’ 
performance. In this stream of research, while most of the existing literature focuses on comparing the stock 
performance of firms listed on the main and second-tier stock exchanges (e.g., Johan, 2010; Vismara et al., 
2012), we focus on the operating performance around the deregulation. As described later, in the second stream 
of research, the operating growth around the IPO has been investigated. Furthermore, although prior empirical 
studies of post-IPO performance use earnings, firm size, and TFP (Jain and Kini, 1994; Pagano et al., 1998; 
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Chemmanur et al., 2009), less is known about the impact of relaxing listing standards on those companies’ 
performance around deregulation.3 
A second stream is the study of decisions to go public and firms’ performance. As Chemmanur et al. (2009) 
note, over the last two decades an extensive body of theoretical work on IPO decisions has been conducted (e.g., 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999; Boot et al., 2006). Chemmanur et al. (2009) use private and public US 
manufacturing firms and examine dynamic changes in operating performance before and after the IPO. Our 
study extends their research by focusing on the relaxing of listing requirements, which has taken place around 
the world although the impact remains unclear. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature. Section 3 
explains the deregulation of the Japanese IPO market during the 1990s and describes the data. Section 4 
presents the results of the empirical analysis, and Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Previous literature on financial regulations and hypotheses 
2.1 Previous literature on deregulations in financial markets and the consequence 
There are two streams of research regarding the listing requirements and their consequences. 4 The first 
stream concerns the transparency of the listed firms. The degree of asymmetric information between firms and 
investors affects the pricing mechanism. Then, the disclosure system and the corporate governance mechanism 
affect the stock price formations (Shi et al., 2013; Akyol et al., 2014). 5   
                                                 
3 One exception is Aslan and Kumer (2011), who find an excess growth of sales and ROA after IPOs. 
4 In other literature, the number of studies is not large, but one important discussion argues that the liberalization of the economy leads 
to financial liberalizations. Rajan and Zingales’s (2003) ‘interest group theory’ argues that the trade and financial openness reduces 
the influence of interest groups. Consistent with their theory, Hauner et al. (2013) find that trade liberalizations lead to financial 
liberalizations. 
5 Recent studies argue that the sophisticating regulation mechanism mitigates the asymmetric information and lowering mispricing 
such as underpricing. Shi et al. (2013) use a 34-country IPO dataset and show that the stringency of disclosure requirements for IPO 
prospectuses is negatively associated with the extent of IPO underpricing; they also find that the disclosure effect on IPO underpricing 
is moderated by the extent of a country’s capital market integration. Akyol et al. (2014) use a European dataset and find that the 
underpricing of the firms in the more transparent corporate governance code reduces after the adoption of the code. This indicates that 
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The second stream, which our research focuses on, investigates the linkage between the degree of 
requirements and the quality of firms. Several recent studies have examined the relationship between listing 
requirements and firms’ performance (Johan, 2010; Espenlaub et al., 2012; Semenenko, 2012; Vismara et al., 
2012; Cattaneo et al., 2015). They find that firms listed under lower listing requirements have lower stock 
returns or a lower survival rate. Vismara et al. (2012) compare the long-term performance of IPOs between the 
main and second-tier markets in European countries, including the main markets of the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) and AIM. They find that the performance of AIM IPOs is poorer than that of LSE IPOs. While these 
studies examined the performance of IPO firms listed on different stock exchanges with different listing 
standards, little is known about the impact of relaxing the requirements of the same stock exchange on 
subsequent IPO firms’ performance. Cattaneo et al. (2015) use a historical dataset in Italy and find that 
tightening the IPO listing requirements increases the survival rate of IPO firms. 
 
2.2 Building the hypotheses 
The first four hypotheses concern the productivity and profitability of IPO firms and predict that IPO firms’ 
growth is low because deregulations enable lower quality firms to go public. The next four hypotheses also 
concern IPO firms’ productivity and profitability but predict that the growth of IPO firms is higher because 
lowering listing requirements enables potentially growing firms that had previously been prohibited from going 
public by listing restrictions to actually to public. The last two hypotheses concern the impact of deregulations 
on firms’ size. 
How does relaxing the listing requirements affect the firm’s subsequent operating performance? There are 
two opposite predictions about the productivity and profitability of IPO firms. First, lowering listing 
requirements enables lower quality firms to go public (Johan, 2010; Semenenko, 2012). Johan (2010) uses a 
Canadian IPO dataset and investigates whether listing requirements affect the short-term abnormal excess return. 
She finds that higher listing standards are related to lower underpricing, suggesting that lowering listing 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the sophisticated corporate governance mechanism serves as a remedy for information asymmetry between the issuers and investors, 
or issuers and financial institutions, which enables the enhancement of the price search mechanism. 
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requirements enables low-quality firms to go public. Using IPOs listed on the US exchanges between 1984 and 
2005, Semenenko (2012) examines whether the listing rules of the exchanges work as an effective screening 
mechanism. His finding partially supports the idea that listing rules screen out lower-quality firms but do not 
work perfectly. These previous studies imply that, if relaxing the listing requirements enables low-quality firms 
to go public, the profitability or productivity in the post-deregulation period would be lower than in the pre-
deregulation period. 
 
H1 Productivity pre-IPO (a) Relaxing listing requirements enables low-productivity firms 
to go public; productivity in the pre-IPO period is lower in the post-deregulation period. 
H2 Productivity post-IPO (a) Relaxing listing requirements enables low-productivity firms 
to go public; productivity in the post-IPO period is lower in the post-deregulation period. 
H3 Profitability pre-IPO (a) Relaxing listing requirements enables low-profitability firms 
to go public; profitability in the pre-IPO period is lower in the post-deregulation period. 
H4 Profitability post-IPO (a) Relaxing listing requirements enables low-profitability firms 
to go public; profitability in the post-IPO period is lower in the post-deregulation period. 
 
As opposed to H1 to H4, we can also predict that lowering the listing requirements results in potentially 
higher growth but does not satisfy the listing requirements regarding firms’ size or firms’ age for going public. 
In Japan, prior to the serial deregulations, small firms could not go public due to the high requirements 
concerning firms’ size or profitability. Lowering the listing requirements enabled these firms to go public. The 
productivity in the pre-IPO period was higher in the post-deregulation period than in the post-deregulation 
period. Hence, we build the following two hypotheses: 
 




H6 Profitability pre-IPO (b) Relaxing listing requirements enables profitable firms to go 
public. 
 
How do listing requirements affect post-IPO growth in terms of productivity and profitability? Although 
Clementi (2002) and Pástor et al. (2008) do not explicitly describe the impact of deregulation, they predict 
declines in both firms’ excess productivity and profitability. Chemmanur et al. (2009) focus on investigating the 
productivity around IPOs—examining whether relaxing listing requirements changes the relationship between 
the decision to go public and subsequent operating performance is beyond their scope. 
We predict that firms’ high profitability or productivity growth declines after they go public for several 
reasons. The first is based on the degree of asymmetric information between insiders and investors that affects 
firms’ IPO decision (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999; Spiegel and Tookes, 2008; Farre-Mensa, 2014). 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) show that firms with lower asymmetric information choose to go public 
because of the lower disclosure cost. Spiegel and Tookes (2008) show that going public forces IPO firms to 
disclose private information about their competitiveness to rivals, which reduces excess profitability or 
productivity during the post-IPO period. Furthermore, several studies investigate the reasoning behind firms 
choosing to go private (Bharath and Dittmar, 2010； Pour and Lasfer, 2013). Bharath and Dittmar (2010) 
investigate the reasons behind firms choosing to go private and find that, if the information production cost is 
high, the firm chooses to go public. Moreover, Pour and Lasfer (2013) investigate the characteristics of firms 
that go private and argue that firms that obtain less benefit from listing choose delisting. 
In addition, IPOs may harm firms’ investment (Asker et al., 2014) or innovation (Bernstein, 2015) behavior, 
which could lead to lower productivity or profitability after IPOs. Based on these arguments, we build the 
following hypotheses regarding the impact of deregulation on post-IPO productivity and profitability growth: 
 




H8 Profitability post-IPO (b) Relaxing listing requirements does not affect post-IPO 
profitability. 
 
There are two predictions concerning IPO firms’ productivity and profitability. First, our empirical analyses 
reject the first prediction, H1 to H4, of lower profitability and productivity around IPOs，indicating results 
consistent with the second prediction, H5 to H8, of high growth in the pre-IPO period and lower or steady 
growth in the post-IPO period. 
The last two hypotheses confirm firms’ size growth around the IPO. The previous literature has argued that 
the growth of smaller firms is higher than that of larger firms in both the industrial organization literature (Hall, 
1987) and the broader economic literature (Haltiwanger et al., 2013; Hsieh and Klenow, 2014; Kueng et al., 
2014). Based on these arguments, the impact of relaxing listing requirements on growth measures would be 
higher in the post-deregulation period when smaller firms have been enabled to go public. If growth is 
remarkable for smaller firms and IPOs provide firms with growth, firms’ subsequent growth should be 
prominent in the post-deregulation period. Furthermore, the theoretical model proposed by Clementi (2002) 
predicts that, although firms’ productivity declines in the post-IPO period, their size growth increases both in 
the pre- and post-IPO periods. We therefore test the following hypotheses: 
 
H9 Size pre-IPO Relaxing listing requirements positively affects firms’ size growth in the 
pre-IPO period. 
H10 Size post-IPO Relaxing listing requirements positively affects firms’ size growth in the 
post-IPO period. 
 
3. Institutional background, data, and matching method 
3.1. Japanese IPO markets and deregulation 
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Following the collapse of the land price bubble in 1990, Japan suffered a long-term recession. To overcome 
this, numerous institutional changes were made to the equity market and the banking sector. As part of the 
deregulation process, the IPO market in Japan was changed in two ways. First, the listing requirements were 
relaxed dramatically after 1999. For instance, the second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) had 
previously required firms to have been in operation for more than five years. The reforms lowered the criterion 
from five years to three years. 
Second, the existing stock exchanges launched new stock markets for start-ups, which required lower listing 
standards. For example, in 1999, the TSE established Mothers (Market of the high-growth and emerging stocks), 
which placed no requirements on firms’ age, net assets, or profits. 6  At the same time, other local stock 
exchanges established stock markets for start-ups: NASDAQ Japan (in the Osaka Stock Exchange) in May 2000, 
Centrex (Nagoya Stock Exchange) in October 1999, Q-board (in the Fukuoka Stock Exchange), and Ambitious 
(in the Sapporo Stock Exchange). These stock exchanges have less stringent listing standards aimed at 
promoting IPOs by young companies that have growth potential but lack sufficient capital. The aim of relaxing 
the listing requirements and creating new markets was to provide attractive firms with high-growth potential 
that did not meet the old listing requirements with opportunities to raise capital. The details of the deregulation 
in Japan are summarized in Appendix A. Through institutional changes, smaller, risky, or less profitable 
companies were enabled to go public. 
 
3.2. Data sources 
                                                 
6 The aim behind establishing Mothers can be seen on its website: “On November 11, 1999, Tokyo Stock Exchange established a new 
market named Mothers (market of the high-growth and emerging stocks), in order to provide venture companies access to funds at an 




The IPO firms’ information comes from two sources: the Factbook of Japanese Equity Issuance, which was 
published by Shoji Houmu until 2001,7 and the Factbook of Japanese IPO published by Pronexus. The financial 
data come from the Nikkei NEEDS-Financial QUEST (NEEDS) provided by Nikkei Media Marketing. Due to 
the different accounting report formats, we exclude financial institutions. We further exclude the regulated 
utility (e.g., water, electricity, gas, and telecommunications) industries from our main analyses. All financial 
items are deflated by using the CPI index from 2010. NEEDS covers the financial data of not only public but 
also private firms that are required to file accounting reports with the Ministry of Finance. In Japan, private 
firms with more than 500 shareholders and more than 10 million yen (about 100,000 US dollars) of public 
equity issued, or more than 100 million yen (approximately 1 million US dollars) of private equity issued are 
required to file financial reports with the Ministry of Finance. Nikkei Media Marketing collects this information 
and the filings for the Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, Nikkei Media Marketing collects accounting 
information from relatively large private firms by sending questionnaires or through face-to-face interviews 
administered by its agents. 
The NEEDS database has two advantages. First, it does not suffer from a survivorship bias because the 
database includes bankrupt firms. Second, the Nikkei covers more than 30 years.8 This long period enables us to 
investigate the effects of environmental change on the performance of IPO firms. On the other hand, the 
weakness is the cross-sectional coverage. Only relatively large firms are required to file financial reports for the 
Ministry of Finance. However, we believe that this coverage restriction does not affect our results. In this paper, 
we compare the outcome of IPO firms with private firms using the matching method. Small companies would 
                                                 
7 Factbook of Japanese Equity Issuance had been published annually as special issues of Junkan Shoji Houmu, which is a magazine 
for practitioners working in corporate law and corporate finance. It covers the information of all IPO firms, including regional and 
OTC markets. 
8 Recently, a growing body of literature on corporate finance has used unlisted firms’ datasets (e.g., Aslan and Kumar, 2011; Brav, 
2009; Gao et al., 2013). In such studies, the dataset from Bureau van Dijk (BvD), the Sageworks Inc dataset, and Capital IQ are 
frequently used. However, the weakness of these datasets is their length. All include no more than 10 years of data. Brav (2009) 
compares capital structures between listed and unlisted firms using the BvD database between 1993 and 2003. The dataset used by 
Aslan and Kumar (2011) covers the period between 1996 and 2006. Asker et al. (2014) use the dataset from Sageworks, which covers 
US private firms. Their sample starts in 2000. Gao et al. (2013) use the dataset from CapitalIQ. 
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therefore not be candidates for the matching firms. Another concern is that the number of private firms in the 
NEEDS dataset may be small. To address this concern, we checked the composition of public and private firms 
in our dataset. Although there are fewer private firms than public firms, on average, 35% of the sample is 
comprised of private firms in any period. 
Table 1 presents the number of firms for each year. The first column reports the number of public firms that 
were listed during the sample period, and the second column reports the number of private firms that were 
unlisted during the sample period, as well as the financial reports recorded in NEEDS. The third column reports 
the number of firms that went public in each year, and the fourth column reports the number of IPOs listed on 
new markets. On average, 2,500 firms are public (column 1) for each year in our sample. The number of private 
firms is approximately 716 per year (column 2) and smaller than that of public firms, but on average, about a 
quarter of the sample is comprised of private firms in any period. The table shows that a sufficient number of 
private firms are included in the NEEDS dataset. In our sample period, 3,135 firms went public. Until 1989, the 
number of IPO firms was less than 70. However, in 1990 and 1991, when Japan experienced a land price boom 
and its collapse in land prices, the number of IPO firms increased. Between 1994 and 2007, except in 1999, the 
number of IPO firms was more than 100; in 2001, the number of IPO firms was 198.  
Table 2 presents the number of public and private firms across industries at the Nikkei two-digit industry 
levels as of 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010. The table shows that the composition of public and private firms 
differs by each industry and each year. For example, for cross-sectional variation, although only 1.8% of the 
firms in the steel industry were private in 2010, 62.7% of firms in the railroad industry were. For the time-series 
variation, the composition of private firms gradually decreases from the 1980s up until 2010. In retail service, 
the percentage of private firms was 39.3% in the 1980s, which had decreased to 7.7% by 2010. These 
differences in the composition of industries may affect our results; therefore, in our analysis, we choose the IPO 
firms’ matched firms from the same industry. 
 
3.3. Matching method 
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We compare the excess growth in pre- and post-deregulation periods rather than the raw growth rate because 
it faces the problem that the quality of the firms or macro conditions have changed over time. In the following 
empirical sections, we mainly use the matched sample based on the propensity score matching method because 
the characteristics of the IPO firms may differ from those of non-IPO firms. One way to test the effects of IPOs 
on firm growth is to compare the growth of IPO firms with that of matching non-IPO firms around IPOs. 
Because these matching firms should not have unobservable factors related to the IPOs, there are two candidate 
subgroups for the matching: the public subsample, which is public firms more than five years from their IPO, 
and the private subsample, consisting of private firms that will not go public within five years.9  
We use propensity score matching without replacement. For the control group, five-nearest-neighbors 
matching is used. We estimate the propensity score by industry-year level using a logit model: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  𝛷𝛷(𝛼𝛼 + 𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿),           (1) 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the binary variable, taking the value of one if the firm i goes public in the year t and the year is 
between three years before and five years after its IPO, and zero otherwise. If firms are more than three years 
prior to or more than five years after their IPOs, we classify the firm-year observations into public or private 
firms. For the control variables, X, we use the natural logarithm of total assets, ROA, the tangible asset ratio, the 
cash-to-asset ratio, and the natural logarithm of employment. All the control variables are lagged variables. 
However, propensity score matching is not a panacea for overcoming the endogeneity. As Roberts and 
Whited (2013) note, propensity score matching does not identify the source of endogeneity. For example, the 
intention to go public may affect subsequent growth, but with such private information, it is difficult to identify 
or choose the most suitable instrument variables. 
 
3.4. Measurements of firm growth 
                                                 
9 We also eliminate firm-year observations of firms that will go public within five years because firms prepare for three to four years 
before they go public. Therefore, the fundamentals of firms going public within five years are likely to be different from those of other 
unlisted companies.  
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We use three measurements as proxies for firm growth: productivity, profitability, and firm size. First, for 
productivity, we use TFP (Chemmanur et al., 2009). We estimate TFP through the semi-parametric approach 
proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). Second, we use profitability, which is defined as operating profit divided 
by total assets. This measure is widely used as a proxy for operating performance in the previous literature such 
as Jain and Kini (1994). Third, for firm size, we use sales growth, which is defined as the ratio of sales in the 
current year to sales in the previous year, and employment growth, which is defined as the ratio of the number 
of employees in the current year to the number of employees in the previous year. Unlike total assets often used 
in the previous literature, sales and the number of employees are not affected by the proceeds from primary 
shares around IPOs. Recent studies investigate the influence of IPOs on employment (Borisov et al. 2012; Ritter, 
2013; Kenney et al., 2012).  
 
3.5. Summary statistics 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of characteristics of IPO firms, public firms, and private firms. Panel 
A presents the characteristics of these firms for the pre-deregulation period, and Panel B presents for the post-
deregulation period. The pre-deregulation period is from 1978 to 1995, and the post-deregulation period is from 
2000 to 2011. We exclude the sample between 1996 and 1999 because the deregulation had been conducted in 
several ways for several years. Before the deregulation, IPO firms were smaller than public firms on average 
but larger than private firms (Panel A). On the other hand, after the deregulation, IPO firms were smaller than 
both public and private firms (Panel B). In addition, the two panels show that IPO firms are on average more 
profitable, have higher cash and cash-equivalent, and have lower financial leverage than both public and private 
firms in both the pre- and post-deregulation periods. 
 
4. Which firms choose to go public? 
We begin our analysis by comparing the level of firm growth measures between the pre-IPO subsample, 
which is three years prior to the IPO, and private firms, which do not go public within ten years. We restrict 
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firms in private firm subsamples, as those do not go public within ten years, which is consistent with the 
definition used in subsequent analyses. 
 
4.1. Operating performance by level in the pre-IPO period 
Fig. 1 plots the levels of TFP of IPO firms three years prior to the IPO and that of the matched private firms. 
The left graph represents the level of TFP of IPO firms in the pre-deregulation period, and the right graph 
represents those of the post-deregulation period. The figures show that the deviation of the distribution post-
deregulation increases and the peak moves toward the right, compared with that of the pre-deregulation period. 
This is also observed in the summary statistics in Table 4. The top four rows report the summary statistics of 
TFPs. Row 1 is the TFP of IPO firms, and row 2 is that of private firms in the pre-deregulation period (until 
1995). On average, the TFP of IPO firms is 15.29 and is higher than that of private firms (14.51), and the 
difference is statistically significant at the 5% level (t-statistics = 2.48). The median of IPO firms is 11.17, 
which is higher than that of private firms (9.49); the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level (z-
statistics = 4.20). These results suggest that the TFP of IPO firms is higher than that of other private firms but 
not different from that of comparable firms. Next, we compare the TFP at pre-IPO firms with their private 
counterparts. The TFP of IPO firms is on average 27.85 and higher than that of other private firms (17.01), and 
the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-statistics = 5.41). We also observe the difference 
when comparing by median; the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level (z-statistics = 9.93). These 
findings show that the productivity of IPO firms is higher than that of the entire private firm subsample but 
almost same as that of the matched firms. Furthermore, productivity under lower listing requirements seems to 
be higher. 
Next, we compare the profitability of IPO firms with that of private firms. The two graphs in Figure 2 show 
that the profitability of pre-IPO firms is higher than that of private firms. The solid lines show the distribution of 
the growth levels of IPO firms. The two graphs show that the profitability of IPO firms is higher than that of 
private firms and that the difference is more pronounced in the pre-deregulation period than in the post-
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deregulation period. This is caused by the listing requirements of the newly established market. As shown in 
Appendix A, some stock markets established approximately in 2000 as a part of deregulation enabled firms with 
negative profitability to go public. The profitability of pre-IPO and private firms is compared in Table 4. The 
findings reveal that the profitability of pre-IPO firms is higher than that of typical private firms. The 
profitability of IPO firms is 0.15 (0.13) in mean (median) and higher than that of private firms, which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. After deregulation, profitability declines. The mean of IPO firms in the 
post-deregulation period is 0.13 and lower than that of the pre-deregulation period (0.15), which is caused by a 
relaxation of the profitability requirements. As shown in Figure 2, some stock exchanges allow firms with 
deficits to go public. In these cases, the deviation of profitability increased. This is shown in the increase of the 
standard deviation of profitability. The standard deviation of profitability for the pre-deregulation period is 0.09, 
and increases to 0.14 in the post-deregulation period. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the graphs for sales and the number of employees, respectively. When comparing the 
pre- and post-deregulation periods, both figures show that the peak of the distribution of IPO firm size moves to 
the left. This indicates that smaller firms are more likely to go public after deregulation. We also find that the 
size of pre-IPO firms gets smaller in the post-deregulation period. In the pre-deregulation period, the mean of 
both the natural logarithm of sales and the number of employees of IPO firms is higher than those of private 
firms and statistically significant (t-statistics = 8.16 for ln(Sales) and = 8.18 for ln(Emp)), but these are lower in 
the post-deregulation period (t-statistics = −7.04 for ln(Sales) and = −6.42 for ln(Emp)). These results can also 
be observed when comparing median values. These results show that the IPO firms’ size, on average, declines 
after the deregulation period. 
Furthermore, Figure 5 shows the time series changes in firm size. We report the 25 percentile and median of 
firms’ total assets prior to IPO. We use total assets in firm size measurements because in several stock markets, 
firm size is used as a listing restriction. We find that both the 25 percentile and the median of firm size have 
decreased since 1995. Before 1995, the 25 percentile of firm size was approximately 7 billion yen to 8 billion 
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yen, and it decreased to approximately 1 billion yen in the 2000s. This also shows that reducing listing 
standards enables small firms to go public. 
Overall, the comparisons of the levels of performance measures indicate that the characteristics of IPO firms 
are different from those of other private firms. The serial deregulations in the IPO market change the IPO firm 
characteristics. In the pre-IPO period, firms planning to go public have higher productivity and profitability. In 
addition, serial deregulations in IPO markets increase the deviation of firms’ productivity or profitability. 
Deregulations in the IPO market reduce the size of IPO firms: firm size in the pre-IPO stage is larger in the pre-
deregulation period and smaller in the post-deregulation period, that is not the case with private firms. 
 
4.2. Going public decision 
We conduct a probit analysis to understand firms’ going public decisions. The dependent variable takes the 
value of one if the firm is three years prior to going public, and zero if the firm is private and does not go public 
within 10 years. The key independent variables are Post Deregulation, which equals one if the firm went public 
in 2000 or later; TFP; Profitability; two size measures (i.e., ln(Sales) and ln(Emp)); and an interaction term with 
Post Deregulation. We also add some control variables. 
Table 5 shows the results of probit regressions and reports the estimated coefficients. Column 1 uses 
ln(Sales) and column 2 uses ln(Emp) as size measures. Both TFP and its interaction term with Post 
Deregulation are statistically insignificant. The estimated coefficient of Profitability is positive, indicating that 
highly profitable firms tend to go public, while the interaction term between Post Deregulation and Profitability 
is negative in two estimations. This means that in the post-deregulation period, the relationship between 
profitability and probability of going public weakens compared with the pre-deregulation period, which can be 
observed in Table 4 and Figure 2. In both columns, the estimated coefficient of firm size is positive and their 
interaction terms with Post Deregulation are negative, suggesting that the probability of going public is higher 
for smaller firms in the post-deregulation period. Our empirical evidence is consistent with the view that 




5. The impact of deregulations on firm growth 
To investigate the impact of deregulations on firm growth, we compare the growth rates of IPO firms with 
those of matched firms before and after the deregulations. We report the results in Tables 6–9. As the matched 
firms, we use public firms in Panel A and private firms in Panel B. We set the period of the first accounting 
report after the IPO as the period t = 0, and compare the growth rate from t = −3 to t = 5. Because our purpose is 
to examine the impact of deregulations, in the post-deregulation subsample, we restrict the firms that went 
public on the newly established stock markets (i.e., Mothers, Heracules, Centrex, Jasdaq NEO, Q-Board, and 
Ambitious). In each table, columns [a] and [d] report the growth rate (in percentage) of IPO firms in pre- and 
post-deregulation, respectively, and columns [b] and [e] report those of the matched firms. Columns [c] (= [a] − 
[b]) and [f] (= [d] − [e]) report the differences in growth between IPO firms and matched firms in pre- and post-
deregulation, respectively. Lastly, column [g] (= [f] − [c]) is the difference in excess returns between pre- and 
post-deregulation. Because our focus in this paper is to understand the impact of the serial deregulations on firm 
growth, we evaluate our hypotheses by using column [g]. 
 
5.1. Impact of deregulations on productivity 
Table 6 reports the results for TFP growth. In Panel A, column [a] reports the average TFP growth of IPO 
firms around the IPO in the pre-deregulation period. The peak of TFP growth is two years prior to their IPOs, 
and the level is 0.057. After that, the growth rate declines and then becomes negative in periods t = 1, 2, and 3. 
In column [c], the TFP growth of IPO firms is lower than that of matched public firms both before and after 
their IPOs; the differences are statistically significant (except t = 4). Next, we focus on the post-deregulation 
period. In contrast to the result in the pre-deregulation period, the growth of IPO firms before their IPOs is 
higher than that of matched public firms (column [f]). When comparing TFP growth before and after 
deregulation, the difference is positive and is at a maximum of 29%, but it becomes weaker or disappears in the 
post-IPO period (column [g]). 
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Panel B shows that the TFP growth for IPO firms is also lower than that of matched private firms (column 
[c]). The result suggests that firms that have lower productivity growth choose to go public and that the post-
IPO growth of such firms is still low in the pre-deregulation period. In the post-deregulation period, the growth 
of IPO firms is higher; the difference is statistically significant before the IPO with the exception of the period t 
= −1 and those are negative, especially in the first two years after the IPO (column [f]). 
Lastly, we compare the excess growth of TFP before and after deregulation in column [g], which is the 
difference between the excess TFP growth in the pre-deregulation period (column [c]) and that in the post-
deregulation period (column [f]), respectively. In both Panels A and B, the TFP growths before IPO are higher 
than those of matched firms, This indicates that relaxing the listing requirements enables firms with higher 
productivity to go public; however, positive growth is not sustained after IPOs, which is consistent with H5 and 
rejects H1. 
However, the difference in excess growth does not sustain. In the post-IPO period, productivity growth after 
going public decreases in comparison with what was observed before going public. For instance, in Panel A, the 
difference in excess growth is positive and is at a maximum of 29% before the IPOs, and then it becomes 
weaker or disappears in the post-IPO period. The result is consistent with H7: that relaxing listing requirements 
does not affect post-IPO productivity. These results imply that IPOs mitigate asymmetric information between 
the IPO firm and its competitors, thus reducing the competitiveness of the company. Furthermore, IPOs might 
decrease the firm’s investment activities (Asker et al., 2014) or innovation process (Bernstein, 2015). Our 
evidence is consistent with these arguments. 
 
5.2. Impact on profitability 
Table 7 presents the results for profitability growth. Panels A and B show that firms that have higher 
profitability growth are more likely to go public after deregulation; however, this is not sustained in the post-
IPO period. Column [g] in both Panels A and B report the difference in excess profitability growth between the 
post- and pre-IPO periods and show that the differences in excess growth are positive before IPOs and period t 
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= 0, which is just after the IPO. This indicates that firms with higher profitability growth on average choose to 
go public; however, the growth is not sustained after IPOs, which is consistent with H6, which predicts that 
relaxing listing requirements enables profitable firms to go public, and H8, which predicts that relaxing listing 
requirements does not affect post-IPO profitability. 
In the pre-IPO period, the profitability growth of IPO firms is higher in both the pre- and post-deregulation 
periods. Pre-IPO profitability growth is higher in the post-deregulation period. These results suggest that 
relaxing the listing requirements enables profitable firms to go public. However, the difference diminishes in 
the post-IPO period. 
Overall, the productivity and profitability growth of IPO firms are higher in the pre-IPO period, and the 
growth disappears or sometimes becomes negative in the post-IPO period. Further, when focusing on the impact 
of deregulation, we find that both profitability and productivity growth is higher in the post-deregulation period 
only pre-IPO, which indicates that relaxing listing requirements enables highly productive and profitable 
companies to go public. 
 
5.3. Impact on firm size 
We turn to the results of firms’ size growth. As a whole, the results are consistent with hypotheses H9 and 
H10, which predict that relaxing listing requirements positively affects firms’ size growth in the pre- and post-
IPO periods. The findings show that IPO firms grow in the pre- and post-IPO periods when compared with both 
private and public matching firms; excess growth is higher in the period of relaxed listing requirements. 
Table 8 reports the sales growth around IPOs and the impact of deregulation in the IPO markets. Panel A 
compares IPO firms and public firms. The peak of sales growth is three years prior to the IPOs in the pre-
deregulation period and two years prior to IPOs in the post-deregulation period. The sales growth of IPO firms 
is higher than that of matched firms before and after the IPO in both pre- and post-deregulations. In the pre-
deregulation period, the difference is positive and statistically significant, at least at the 10% level, not only in 
the pre-IPO period, t = −3, −2, and −1, but also in the post-IPO period, t = 3, 4, and 5. In Panel B, in the pre-
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deregulation period, the sales growth of IPO firms is higher and statistically significant except for t = 0, which 
has only a negative value. In the post-deregulation period, all the differences in sales growth between IPO firms 
and matched firms are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, except for three periods, and one of 
the three is significant at the 5% level. 
Next, we investigate the impact of deregulations on sales growth in IPO firms. In column [g] of Panel A, we 
find that the difference in excess growth is positive and statistically significant in all periods. We also find that, 
except for two periods, t = 4 and t = 5 in Panel B, the difference is positive and statistically significant. These 
results suggest that lowering listing requirements enables growing firms to go public and enables them to grow 
more after IPOs, which is consistent with H9 and 10.  
Table 9 presents the change in employment growth as a proxy for firm size. We find that the results are 
consistent with H9 and 10, which predict that relaxing listing requirements positively affects firms’ size growth 
in the pre- and post-IPO periods. The difference between the excess growth of the post- and pre- periods is 
positive and statistically significant in all periods (column [g] of Panels A and B). This indicates that in the 
aspect of employment, deregulation provides higher growth for IPO firms. The impact of deregulation is 
relevant in post-IPO periods. In both Panels, in the pre-deregulation period, the IPO firms’ employment growth 
is pronounced in the pre-IPO period but diminishes in the post-IPO period. In the pre-IPO period, the 
employment growth of IPO firms is higher than that of matched private and public firms and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level—both compared with public firms (Panel A) and private firms (Panel B). On the 
other hand, in the post-IPO period, the difference is first diminished (in period t = 0, 1, 2) and then reappears (in 
t = 4 and 5). In contrast, the excess growth does not diminish in the post-deregulation period (column [f]). In the 
post-deregulation period, the excess growth does not diminish in the post-IPO period. The employment growth 
of IPO firms is higher in all periods when compared with public firms (Panel A), which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level and higher until t = 3 when compared with private firms (Panel B).  
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These results suggest that lowering listing requirements enables growing firms to go public and enables them 
to grow more after IPOs, which is consistent with H9 and H10, which predicts that relaxing listing requirements 
positively affects firms’ size growth in the pre- and post-IPO periods. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Although the institutional design of IPO markets has been debated around the world, the relation between the 
institutional design and performance has not been clearly established in the literature. This study examines 
whether IPOs stimulate firm growth and whether serial deregulation helps firms with growth potential to go 
public. Using a long-term panel dataset including both public and private firms, we investigate (i) the impact of 
IPOs compared with their public/private counterparts and (ii) how deregulations in the IPO market, relaxing 
listing requirements, or building new markets affect the growth of IPO firms. We use the following 
measurements as firm growth: (1) productivity, (2) profitability, and (3) the two size measurements of sales and 
number of employees. 
First, we find that the growth of IPO firms differs between the quality and quantity measurements. When 
conducting the within-firm variation, we find that post-IPO growth declines in both aspects of quality and 
quantity. The drop in firms’ profitability and productivity growth after an IPO is higher in the quality 
measurements. Furthermore, when compared with their matched firms, we find that post-IPO growth in the 
aspect of quality is negative, which indicates that IPOs do not necessarily affect the growth of IPO firms’ 
quality. 
Second, we investigate the impact of deregulations in IPO markets. We also observe the different effect of 
deregulations on quality and quantity measurements. We find that, regarding the aspect of quality, serial 
deregulations do not affect IPO firm growth, both measured by TFP and profitability growth. On the other hand, 
they have a positive impact on quantity growth, measured by sales and numbers of employee. 
This paper contributes to the literature on IPOs specifically in terms of the influence of IPO markets relaxing 
listing standards and firms’ operating growth around IPOs. This paper contributes not only to the academic 
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literature but also to the literature for policymakers. Although newly established markets or the relaxed listing 
standards of stock markets are expected to improve the economy by enabling small firms to access the public 
market, the influence is limited. Why do the deregulations not link to improve the productivity or profitability 
of IPO firms? This question is far beyond the scope of this study. One possibility is Stigler’s (1971) private 
interest theory, which points out that some private benefit distorts the influence of deregulations and which 
causes effectiveness of the regulations. 
Our findings indicate that although these relaxed listing standards enable such firms to grow faster in terms 
of firm size, they do not affect the quality of productivity and profitability. On the other hand, the previous 
literature emphasizes that lowering listing requirements enables low-quality firms to go public; however, our 
findings indicate that it enables more small firms to access outside financing, which is linked to job creation; 
this has received less attention in the previous literature. Although job creation is one of the main themes in 
economics, few studies investigate the relationship between firms’ decision to go public and job creation (the 
few exceptions are Borisov et al., 2012, Ritter, 2013, and Kenney et al., 2012) or whether the development of 
financial system influences the job creations (Krishnan et al., 2014). 
 
Appendix A: Deregulation of the Japanese IPO market in the 1990s 
Japanese stock exchanges deregulated listing requirements and provided new stock markets for start-ups in 
the 1990s. The over-the-counter (OTC) market, which was the major market for start-ups wishing to go public, 
and other stock exchanges were deregulated in two ways in 1994: the relaxing of the listing requirements and 
the withdrawal of the restrictions on the number of IPOs that could take place. First, the OTC market created a 
new market called Tentou Tokusoku for start-ups. The purpose of this market was to enable R&D-based or 
human-capital-based firms to be listed (Junkan Shouji Houmu, 1995). However, only three firms went public on 
Tentou Tokusoku, and it vanished in 1998 after the law on listing requirements was revised. Junkan Shouji 
Houmu (1995) argues that evaluating these firms was difficult for securities companies, which led to a decrease 
in the number of firms listed on Tentou Tokusoku. 
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Despite this failure, other stock markets such as the TSE and the OSE were created specifically for start-ups. 
In 1999, the NASDAQ and Softbank, which is an IT-based company in Japan, announced the creation of a new 
stock market called NASDAQ Japan. However, the NASDAQ withdrew from the partnership in October of the 
same year because of low profitability. In December 2002, the OSE took over NASDAQ Japan and relaunched 
it as Hercules. Hercules was subsequently merged with the JASDAQ (see below) in October 2010. Meanwhile, 
the TSE created a new market for start-ups in November 1999, called the “Market of the High Growth and 
Emerging Stocks” (Mothers). The Tokyo Stock Exchange also established a stock market for sophisticated 
investors, named Tokyo AIM in 2009, which is joint program with London AIM. However, only two firms had 
been listed on the market when the cooperative relationship with LSE resolved in 2012, and it was renamed the 
Tokyo Pro Market.  
Lastly, in July 2001, the OTC market was converted into a stock market and was renamed the JASDAQ 
following the Financial Reform Law of December 1998; it was to be run by the Japan Securities Dealers’ 
Association (JSDA). JASDAQ created a new market focusing on new technology-oriented companies in 2007, 
which is named JASDAQ NEO. These three stock markets, JASDAQ, Hercules, and Mothers are often 
regarded as the top three markets for start-ups in Japan. In addition, other regional securities exchanges such as 
Sapporo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Fukuoka created their own stock markets for start-up companies. 
The second change was that the stock markets and the OTC market withdrew the regulation about the 
maximum number of listings allowed each week. In 1991, the number of listings on the OTC market was 
restricted to one firm per week.10 This number increased slightly thereafter, and in April 1994, the restriction 
was repealed (Junkan Shouji Houmu, 1993).  
Owing to these deregulations, the number of IPOs increased throughout the 1990s, from 27 in 1992 to 187 in 
1995, which was larger than the number in 1989 and 1990 during the real estate bubble. However, the IPO 
boom crumbled in 2008: just 49 IPOs took place in that year, one-third the number in the previous year. There 
                                                 
10 The purpose of this regulation was to maintain the liquidity of the firms that went public. 
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has been no recovery in the number of IPOs since then in our sample period. Table Appendix A summarizes the 
listing requirements for newly established stock markets. 
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Table 1 Number of public and private firms included in the NEEDS database 
This table presents the number of companies by category and year between 1977 and 2011. Public firms are those that were listed 
on stock exchanges during the sample period. Private firms indicate those that were not listed during the sample period. No. of 
IPOs indicates those firms that went public during the sample period. No. of IPOs for new markets indicates those firms that went 
public on new market during the sample period. 
  
  
Year Public firms Private firms No. of IPOs
No. of IPOs for new
markets
1977 1,482 396 6
1978 1,473 825 16
1979 1,507 824 29
1980 1,554 836 19
1981 1,562 835 27
1982 1,579 870 30
1983 1,599 870 26
1984 1,614 868 28
1985 1,633 837 38
1986 1,701 822 50
1987 1,820 830 52
1988 1,797 838 66
1989 1,877 835 92
1990 2,070 800 110
1991 2,238 756 138
1992 2,320 726 75
1993 2,370 702 49
1994 2,478 696 109
1995 2,602 692 151
1996 2,788 690 182
1997 2,909 692 144
1998 3,023 695 121
1999 3,077 692 91
2000 3,177 697 141 22
2001 3,317 701 198 68
2002 3,399 689 159 39
2003 3,443 683 135 40
2004 3,474 664 148 49
2005 3,569 671 170 63
2006 3,634 675 167 65
2007 3,731 675 169 73
2008 3,703 500 95 40
2009 3,602 481 38 14
2010 3,496 472 28 6




Table 2 Distribution by industry 
This table presents the number of companies by industry in 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010. The industry classification is based on 
the Nikkei two-digit industry codes. We also report the number of public (private) firms. The percentage represents the number of 











































Food Products 95 30 24.0% 111 48 30.2% 152 33 17.8% 135 21 13.5%
Textiles 66 7 9.6% 65 14 17.7% 71 8 10.1% 55 3 5.2%
Paper 30 11 26.8% 29 13 31.0% 31 9 22.5% 23 2 8.0%
Chemicals 141 46 24.6% 164 57 25.8% 208 29 12.2% 206 14 6.4%
Drugs 35 18 34.0% 39 17 30.4% 52 9 14.8% 52 11 17.5%
Oil 12 4 25.0% 11 3 21.4% 9 4 30.8% 13 0.0%
Rubber Products 17 6 26.1% 18 5 21.7% 25 2 7.4% 22 1 4.3%
Concrete and Glass Products 63 20 24.1% 65 26 28.6% 78 15 16.1% 64 7 9.9%
Steel Works 59 8 11.9% 60 8 11.8% 63 3 4.5% 56 1 1.8%
Precious Metals 96 37 27.8% 103 46 30.9% 148 28 15.9% 136 13 8.7%
Machinery 174 58 25.0% 203 65 24.3% 258 49 16.0% 245 17 6.5%
Electric Equipment 164 62 27.4% 214 55 20.4% 287 64 18.2% 296 19 6.0%
Shipbuilding and Repairing 8 0.0% 7 0.0% 7 0.0% 6 0.0%
Automobiles 59 25 29.8% 64 26 28.9% 90 15 14.3% 81 5 5.8%
Transportation Equipment 16 5 23.8% 18 3 14.3% 19 2 9.5% 13 1 7.1%
Measuring Devices 31 12 27.9% 38 10 20.8% 46 19 29.2% 52 9 14.8%
Manufacturing, Printing 47 26 35.6% 63 41 39.4% 113 29 20.4% 121 9 6.9%
Fish and marine products 5 3 37.5% 7 3 30.0% 10 5 33.3% 10 2 16.7%
Coal Mining 10 5 33.3% 9 5 35.7% 9 5 35.7% 9 0.0%
Construction 138 67 32.7% 158 79 33.3% 244 34 12.2% 185 17 8.4%
Wholesale 127 163 56.2% 204 191 48.4% 375 137 26.8% 379 45 10.6%
Retail 51 33 39.3% 103 81 44.0% 242 90 27.1% 276 23 7.7%
Real Estate 38 66 63.5% 54 78 59.1% 74 136 64.8% 121 43 26.2%
Railroad and Bus Transits 30 49 62.0% 31 57 64.8% 34 56 62.2% 28 47 62.7%
Trucking 15 12 44.4% 17 17 50.0% 37 10 21.3% 36 5 12.2%
Shipping 25 16 39.0% 23 19 45.2% 21 15 41.7% 16 3 15.8%
Air Transportation 5 1 16.7% 6 1 14.3% 7 2 22.2% 5 5 50.0%
Warehousing 28 17 37.8% 32 21 39.6% 39 18 31.6% 44 10 18.5%
Communication Services 7 37 84.1% 8 56 87.5% 21 86 80.4% 36 31 46.3%
Utilities - Electric 9 3 25.0% 10 3 23.1% 10 3 23.1% 11 2 15.4%
Utilities - Gas 9 11 55.0% 9 14 60.9% 11 12 52.2% 13 7 35.0%
Miscellaneous Service, Hotels 59 145 71.1% 127 263 67.4% 386 502 56.5% 751 200 21.0%




Table 3 Comparisons of firm characteristics between IPO firms and public (private) firms 
This table presents the results of univariate tests between the characteristics of IPO firms and Public (Private) firms. ln(Total Assets) is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. IPO firm 
in Panel B is firms listed on new markets (Mothers, Heracules, Centrex, Jasdaq NEO, Q-Board, and Ambitious). ROA is operating income divided by total assets at the end of the previous 
fiscal year. Tangible Assets is defined as tangible assets scaled by total assets. Cash/Assets is defined as (cash and deposit plus cash and cash equivalents) divided by current total assets. 
Loan/Assets is defined as (short-term loans payable and corporate bonds plus long-term loans payable plus bonds and convertible bonds) divided by current total assets. The significance of the 
difference in means is assessed using a t-test. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: 1978 to 1995
No. of obs. Mean
Standard
Deviation Median No. of obs. Mean
Standard
Deviation Median Diff. t -statistics No. of obs. Mean
Standard
Deviation Median Diff. t -statistics
[a] [b] [a] − [b] [c] [a] − [c]
ln(Total Assets) 1,142 9.592 0.873 9.518 27,330 10.744 1.492 10.627 -1.152 -34.74 *** 12,546 9.127 1.380 9.169 0.465 11.19 ***
ROA 1,142 0.148 0.079 0.133 27,330 0.085 0.056 0.079 0.063 46.91 *** 12,546 0.097 0.075 0.085 0.051 22.00 ***
Tangible Assets 1,142 0.996 0.013 0.999 27,330 0.996 0.011 0.999 -0.001 -3.60 *** 12,546 0.994 0.032 0.999 0.001 1.51
Cash/Assets 1,142 0.165 0.097 0.144 27,330 0.148 0.081 0.135 0.017 13.29 *** 12,546 0.157 0.108 0.139 0.007 2.26 **
Loan/Assets 1,142 0.169 0.131 0.154 27,330 0.196 0.156 0.177 -0.027 -4.88 *** 12,546 0.187 0.168 0.156 -0.018 -3.56 ***
Panel B: 2000 to 2011
No. of obs. Mean Median No. of obs. Mean
Standard
Deviation Median Diff. t -statistics No. of obs. Mean
Standard
Deviation Median Diff. t -statistics
[d] [e] [d] − [e] [f] [d] − [f]
ln(Total Assets) 432 7.516 1.042 7.414 31,481 10.646 1.495 10.469 -3.129 -43.35 *** 6,241 9.297 1.772 9.289 -1.781 -20.64 ***
ROA 432 0.244 0.144 0.246 31,481 0.075 0.060 0.067 0.169 56.31 *** 6,241 0.060 0.066 0.051 0.184 50.26 ***
Tangible Assets 432 0.952 0.082 0.985 31,481 0.983 0.035 0.993 -0.031 -17.99 *** 6,241 0.984 0.047 0.997 -0.033 -13.11 ***
Cash/Assets 432 0.355 0.208 0.319 31,481 0.137 0.106 0.110 0.218 41.53 *** 6,241 0.135 0.134 0.097 0.220 31.54 ***
Loan/Assets 432 0.152 0.168 0.097 31,481 0.166 0.234 0.125 -0.014 -1.23 6,241 0.189 0.299 0.119 -0.038 -2.58 ***
IPO firms Public firms Private firms
IPO firms Public firms Private firms
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Table 4 Comparing the measurements between pre-IPO firms and private firms 
This table reports the compare the distributions of IPO firms with private firms for four measurements, TFP, earnings, sales, and employees. We report those measurements of IPO firms those 
three years prior to the IPOs and private firms. IPO firms in post subsample are those listed on new markets (Mothers, Heracules, Centrex, Jasdaq NEO, Q-Board, and Ambitious). ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Column “t-statistics (vs. all private) reports” the t-test between the IPO firms at t-3 and private firms, those do not go public 
within ten years. Column “z-statistics (vs. all private) reports” the z-statistics by Willcoxon test between the IPO firms at t-3 and private firms, those do not go public within ten years. Column 
“mean (matched)” report the mean value of the matched firms. 
  





TFP pre IPO firms (t − 3) 1,005 15.291 14.727 11.173 2.48 ** 4.20 *** 14.99 1.54
Private firms 10,017 14.511 15.892 9.494
post IPO firms (t  − 3) 300 21.693 18.831 17.033 3.56 *** 6.12 *** 18.72 2.44 **
Private firms 4,357 17.493 19.854 12.373
Profitability pre IPO firms (t  − 3) 1,005 0.151 0.091 0.130 20.20 *** 18.34 *** 0.15 -0.37
Private firms 10,053 0.099 0.075 0.087
post IPO firms (t  − 3) 311 0.128 0.173 0.117 15.56 *** 8.42 *** 0.06 5.80 ***
Private firms 4,515 0.055 0.069 0.047
ln(Sales) pre IPO firms (t  − 3) 1,005 9.660 1.040 9.613 8.16 *** 6.99 *** 9.76 -2.60 ***
Private firms 10,053 9.209 1.720 9.393
post IPO firms (t  − 3) 311 6.852 1.398 6.950 -13.45 *** -13.42 *** 6.59 3.28 ***
Private firms 4,511 8.570 2.224 8.595
ln(Emp) pre IPO firms (t  − 3) 1,005 5.872 0.977 5.886 8.18 *** 7.01 *** 5.97 -2.64 ***
Private firms 10,053 5.494 1.428 5.700
post IPO firms (t  − 3) 311 3.563 1.122 3.584 -11.52 *** -12.94 *** 3.26 4.08 ***









Table 5 Determination for going public 
This table reports the determination for the going public decision. Dependent variable takes the value of one if the firm goes 
public three years later, and zero if the firm is privately held and does not go public within three years. A probit model is used. 
Post Deregulation takes the value of one if the observation is 2000 or later, and zero otherwise. TFP is estimated by semi-
parametric approach proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). Profitability is operating income divided by total assets at the end of 
the previous fiscal year. ln(Sales) is defined as the natural logarithm of sales. ln(Emp) is natural logarithm of number of 
employment. Cash/Assets is defined as (cash and deposit plus cash and cash equivalents) divided by current total assets. 
Loan/Assets is defined as (short-term loans payable and corporate bonds plus long-term loans payable plus bonds and convertible 
bonds) divided by current total assets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
   
[1] [2]
TFP t-1 -0.361 -0.207
(0.439) (0.32)
… x Post Deregulation 0.560 0.366
(0.438) (0.33)
Profitability t-1 2.892*** 2.863***
(0.159) (0.16)








… x Post Deregulation -0.099***
(0.02)
Tangibility t-1 1.877*** 1.902***
(0.726) (0.73)
… x Post Deregulation -2.553*** -2.628***
(0.802) (0.80)
Cash/Assets t-1 0.471*** 0.458***
(0.119) (0.12)
… x Post Deregulation 0.296* 0.359**
(0.172) (0.17)
Loan/Assets t-1 0.618*** 0.618***
(0.0730) (0.07)
… x Post Deregulation -0.555*** -0.561***
(0.0846) (0.08)
Post Deregulation 2.975*** 2.722***
(0.809) (0.81)
Year Fixed Effects yes yes
Industry Fixed Effects yes yes
No. of obs. 29,134 29,134
Pseudo R2 0.123 0.117
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Table 6 Growth of IPO firms: productivity 
This table reports the comparison of the TFP growth rate between IPO firms and public (private) firms for each accounting period. IPO firms in the pre-deregulation period consist of firms that 
went public before 1995 and in the post-deregulation period are firms that went public after 2000 on new markets (Mothers, Heracules, Centrex, Jasdaq NEO, Q-Board, and Ambitious). The 
propensity score matching procedure is used to identify the matching firms of each IPO firm in each period between t = −3 and t = 5. In panel A, matched firms are chosen from a subsample of 
those that have been listed for at least five years. In panel B, matched firms are chosen from a subsample of firms that are unlisted and will not go public within the next five years. First, by 
estimating 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  𝛷𝛷(𝛼𝛼 + 𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿) using a logit model, we identify the five firms with the nearest scores from the Public (Private) subsample and then compare the growth measurement for each 
period. Columns [a] and [d] report the IPO firms’ growth for each period, and columns [b] and [e] report the matched firms’ growth. The difference between the two subsamples, the excess 
growth, and the t-statistics are reported in columns [c] and [f]. Column [g] shows the difference in excess growth between the pre- and post-deregulation periods, in other words the difference 
between columns [f] and [c]. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: IPO firms vs. public firms
No. of obs. IPO firms
Matched-
public firms





Period (t ) [a] [b] [c] (= [a] − [b]) [d] [e] [f] (= [d] − [e]) [g] (= [f] − [c])
−3 1,003 0.052 0.172 -0.120 -11.06 *** 273 0.212 0.147 0.065 1.94 * 0.184 6.81 ***
−2 977 0.057 0.143 -0.086 -8.38 *** 338 0.263 0.058 0.205 6.57 *** 0.291 11.51 ***
−1 986 0.054 0.125 -0.071 -7.37 *** 432 0.259 0.075 0.184 8.00 *** 0.255 12.10 ***
0 1,008 0.019 0.102 -0.083 -10.74 *** 471 0.117 0.097 0.021 0.99 0.103 5.67 ***
1 897 -0.040 0.066 -0.106 -14.13 *** 543 -0.023 0.076 -0.100 -5.48 *** 0.006 0.37
2 804 -0.036 0.041 -0.077 -9.16 *** 514 0.056 0.062 -0.006 -0.29 0.071 3.78 ***
3 759 -0.008 0.032 -0.040 -4.44 *** 465 0.080 0.074 0.006 0.29 0.045 2.37 **
4 675 0.015 0.026 -0.010 -1.04 402 0.052 0.058 -0.005 -0.24 0.005 0.25
5 541 0.005 0.027 -0.022 -2.24 ** 326 0.067 0.039 0.028 1.12 0.050 2.16 **
Panel B: IPO firms vs. private firms
No. of obs. IPO firms
Matched-
private firms





Period (t ) [a] [b] [c] (= [a] − [b]) [d] [e] [f] (= [d] − [e])
−3 1,003 0.052 0.073 -0.021 -2.34 ** 273 0.212 0.150 0.061 1.85 * 0.082 3.37 ***
−2 977 0.057 0.072 -0.015 -1.66 * 338 0.263 0.196 0.068 2.19 ** 0.082 3.49 ***
−1 986 0.054 0.063 -0.008 -1.04 432 0.259 0.294 -0.035 -1.50 -0.026 -1.34
0 1,008 0.019 0.067 -0.048 -7.22 *** 471 0.117 0.192 -0.075 -3.77 *** -0.027 -1.63
1 897 -0.040 0.044 -0.085 -11.91 *** 454 -0.070 0.125 -0.195 -10.90 *** -0.110 -6.81 ***
2 804 -0.036 0.023 -0.059 -7.29 *** 433 0.058 0.093 -0.035 -1.59 0.023 1.20
3 759 -0.008 0.015 -0.023 -2.67 *** 399 0.087 0.103 -0.016 -0.72 0.007 0.38
4 675 0.015 0.013 0.003 0.29 350 0.056 0.077 -0.021 -0.89 -0.024 -1.09
5 541 0.005 0.012 -0.007 -0.73 283 0.074 0.085 -0.011 -0.41 -0.004 -0.17
t- statistics t- statistics
t- statistics
[g] (= [f] − [c])
Pre-deregulations Post-deregulations Post − Pre
Pre-deregulations Post-deregulations Post − Pre




Table 7 Growth of IPO firms: profitability 
This table reports the comparison of the operating growth rate between IPO firms and public (private) firms for each accounting period. IPO firms in the pre-deregulation period consist of 
firms that went public before 1995 and in the post-deregulation period are firms that went public after 2000 on new markets (Mothers, Heracules, Centrex, Jasdaq NEO, Q-Board, and 
Ambitious). The propensity score matching procedure is used to identify the matching firms of each IPO firm in each period between t = −3 and t = 5. In panel A, matched firms are chosen 
from the subsample of firms that have been listed for at least five years. In panel B, matched firms are chosen from the subsample of firms that are unlisted and will not go public within the 
next five years. First, by estimating 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  𝛷𝛷(𝛼𝛼 + 𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿) using a logit model, we identify the five firms with the nearest scores from the Public (Private) subsample and then compare the 
growth measurement for each period. Columns [a] and [d] report the IPO firms’ growth for each period, and columns [b] and [e] report the matched firms’ growth. The difference between the 
two subsamples, in terms of excess growth, and the t-statistics are reported in columns [c] and [f]. Column g shows the difference in excess growth between the pre- and post-deregulation 
periods, in other words the difference between columns [f] and [c]. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: IPO firms vs. public firms
No. of obs. IPO firms
Matched-
public firms





Period (t ) [a] [b] [c] (= [a] − [b]) [d] [e] [f] (= [d] − [e]) [g] (= [f] − [c])
−3 1,005 0.324 0.173 0.150 4.96 *** 308 0.132 -0.126 0.258 1.89 * 0.108 1.16
−2 981 0.294 0.149 0.144 4.56 *** 368 0.683 0.029 0.654 4.75 *** 0.510 5.16 ***
−1 1,003 0.268 0.172 0.096 3.52 *** 449 0.872 -0.030 0.901 8.21 *** 0.806 9.60 ***
0 1,047 0.139 0.175 -0.035 -1.89 * 480 0.595 0.036 0.559 7.22 *** 0.595 10.03 ***
1 919 -0.016 0.115 -0.131 -6.48 *** 559 -0.174 -0.050 -0.124 -1.85 * 0.007 0.12
2 819 -0.051 0.053 -0.103 -3.80 *** 536 -0.072 -0.039 -0.034 -0.45 0.070 1.01
3 776 -0.020 0.028 -0.048 -1.38 488 -0.083 -0.031 -0.052 -0.77 -0.005 -0.07
4 691 0.033 0.028 0.004 0.11 425 -0.097 -0.037 -0.060 -0.70 -0.065 -0.78
5 551 -0.017 0.054 -0.071 -1.80 * 340 -0.056 -0.043 -0.013 -0.14 0.058 0.68
Panel B: IPO firms vs. private firms
No. of obs. IPO firms
Matched-
private firms





Period (t ) [a] [b] [c] (= [a] − [b]) [d] [e] [f] (= [d] − [e])
−3 1,005 0.324 0.262 0.062 2.26 ** 308 0.132 -0.180 0.312 2.16 ** 0.251 2.67 ***
−2 981 0.294 0.283 0.011 0.41 368 0.683 -0.326 1.009 7.22 *** 0.999 10.44 ***
−1 1,003 0.268 0.243 0.024 1.06 449 0.872 -0.447 1.319 10.97 *** 1.295 14.81 ***
0 1,047 0.139 0.290 -0.150 -7.91 *** 480 0.595 -0.152 0.747 9.64 *** 0.897 15.08 ***
1 919 -0.016 0.154 -0.170 -8.46 *** 469 -0.223 -0.010 -0.213 -2.90 *** -0.043 -0.72
2 819 -0.051 0.057 -0.107 -3.69 *** 455 -0.068 -0.046 -0.023 -0.28 0.084 1.16
3 776 -0.020 0.068 -0.088 -2.55 ** 421 -0.109 0.015 -0.124 -1.61 -0.035 -0.48
4 691 0.033 0.059 -0.026 -0.67 371 -0.127 0.055 -0.183 -1.94 * -0.157 -1.81 *
5 551 -0.017 0.066 -0.082 -2.08 ** 297 -0.048 0.058 -0.106 -1.05 -0.023 -0.25
t- statistics t- statistics
t- statistics
[g] (= [f] − [c])
Pre-deregulations Post-deregulations Post − Pre
Pre-deregulations Post-deregulations Post − Pre




Table 8 Growth of IPO firms: size (sales) 
This table reports the comparison of the sales growth rate between IPO firms and public (private) firms for each accounting period. IPO firms in the pre-deregulation period consist of firms 
that went public before 1995 and in the post-deregulation period are firms that went public after 2000 on new markets (Mothers, Heracules, Centrex, Jasdaq NEO, Q-Board, and Ambitious). 
The propensity score matching procedure is used to identify the matching firms of each IPO firm in each period between t = −3 and t = 5. In panel A, matched firms are chosen from the 
subsample of firms that have been listed for at least five years. In panel B, the matched firms are chosen from the subsample of firms that are unlisted and will not go public within the next five 
years. First, by estimating 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  𝛷𝛷(𝛼𝛼 + 𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿) using a logit model, we identify the firm with the nearest score from the Public (Private) subsample, and then we compare the growth 
measurement for each period. Columns [a] and [d] report the IPO firms’ growth for each period, and columns [b] and [e] report the matched firms’ growth. The difference between the two 




Panel A: IPO firms vs. public firms
No. of obs. IPO firms
Matched-
public firms





Period (t ) [a] [b] [c] (= [a] − [b]) [d] [e] [f] (= [d] − [e]) [g] (= [f] − [c])
−3 1,005 0.160 0.121 0.038 5.45 *** 304 0.516 0.015 0.501 18.75 *** 0.462 23.73 ***
−2 981 0.153 0.128 0.025 3.27 *** 369 0.562 0.081 0.481 19.51 *** 0.456 23.38 ***
−1 1,003 0.143 0.118 0.026 3.60 *** 450 0.526 0.111 0.414 19.31 *** 0.388 21.72 ***
0 1,047 0.100 0.106 -0.006 -1.09 481 0.431 0.109 0.322 15.91 *** 0.329 20.42 ***
1 919 0.066 0.059 0.007 1.25 558 0.225 0.078 0.147 8.67 *** 0.140 9.19 ***
2 819 0.048 0.043 0.006 0.98 535 0.177 0.054 0.123 7.60 *** 0.117 7.85 ***
3 776 0.043 0.033 0.010 1.78 * 488 0.126 0.043 0.084 5.39 *** 0.074 5.22 ***
4 691 0.053 0.034 0.019 2.97 *** 425 0.100 0.046 0.054 3.26 *** 0.034 2.25 **
5 551 0.048 0.036 0.012 1.84 * 341 0.112 0.031 0.081 4.13 *** 0.069 3.95 ***
Panel B: IPO firms vs. private firms
No. of obs. IPO firms
Matched-
private firms





Period (t ) [a] [b] [c] (= [a] − [b]) [d] [e] [f] (= [d] − [e])
−3 1,005 0.160 0.131 0.029 3.88 *** 304 0.516 0.083 0.433 15.05 *** 0.404 19.33 ***
−2 981 0.153 0.122 0.030 4.00 *** 369 0.562 0.089 0.474 17.85 *** 0.443 21.65 ***
−1 1,003 0.143 0.102 0.041 5.96 *** 450 0.526 0.181 0.345 16.79 *** 0.304 17.71 ***
0 1,047 0.100 0.119 -0.020 -3.43 *** 481 0.431 0.176 0.255 13.05 *** 0.275 17.48 ***
1 919 0.066 0.072 -0.006 -0.94 468 0.221 0.096 0.126 7.05 *** 0.131 8.66 ***
2 819 0.048 0.052 -0.004 -0.63 454 0.202 0.096 0.105 5.75 *** 0.109 6.86 ***
3 776 0.043 0.035 0.008 1.37 421 0.139 0.099 0.040 2.26 ** 0.032 2.10 **
4 691 0.053 0.028 0.025 3.76 *** 371 0.116 0.093 0.023 1.21 -0.002 -0.10
5 551 0.048 0.032 0.016 2.35 ** 298 0.130 0.116 0.014 0.59 -0.002 -0.09
t- statistics t- statistics
t- statistics
[g] (= [f] − [c])
Pre-deregulations Post-deregulations Post − Pre
Pre-deregulations Post-deregulations Post − Pre




Table 9 Growth of IPO firms: size (employment) 
This table reports the comparison of the employment growth rate between IPO firms and public (private) firms for each accounting period. IPO firms in the pre-deregulation period consist of 
firms went public before 1995 and in the post-deregulation period are firms went public after 2000 on new markets (Mothers, Heracules, Centrex, Jasdaq NEO, Q-Board, and Ambitious). The 
propensity score matching procedure is used to identify the matching firms of each IPO firm in each period between t = −3 and t = 5. In Panel A, matched firms are chosen from the subsample 
of firms that have been listed for at least five years. In panel B, matched firms are chosen from the subsample of firms that are unlisted and will not go public within the next five years. First, 
by estimating 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  𝛷𝛷(𝛼𝛼 + 𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿) using a logit model, we identify the firm with the nearest score from the Public (Private) subsample and then compare the growth measurement for each 
period. Columns [a] and [d] report the IPO firms’ growth for each period, and columns [b] and [e] report the matched firms’ growth. The difference between the two subsamples, in excess 
growth, and the t-statistics, are reported in columns [c] and [f]. Column [g] shows the difference in excess growth between the pre- and post-deregulation periods, in other words the difference 
between columns f and [c]. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
  
Panel A: IPO firms vs. public firms
No. of obs. IPO firms
Matched-
public firms





Period (t ) [a] [b] [c] (= [a] − [b]) [d] [e] [f] (= [d] − [e]) [g] (= [f] − [c])
−3 1,003 0.128 0.036 0.092 11.25 *** 304 0.423 0.026 0.396 16.48 *** 0.304 15.27 ***
−2 978 0.139 0.040 0.099 13.23 *** 364 0.465 0.056 0.409 17.93 *** 0.309 16.69 ***
−1 986 0.125 0.039 0.086 12.78 *** 447 0.391 0.045 0.346 17.94 *** 0.260 15.91 ***
0 1,008 0.084 0.055 0.029 5.11 *** 479 0.355 0.066 0.290 18.31 *** 0.261 19.18 ***
1 898 0.077 0.034 0.043 8.78 *** 560 0.244 0.066 0.178 12.15 *** 0.135 10.32 ***
2 807 0.066 0.022 0.044 8.05 *** 536 0.161 0.057 0.104 7.42 *** 0.060 4.57 ***
3 765 0.049 0.024 0.026 4.83 *** 489 0.112 0.051 0.061 4.42 *** 0.036 2.76 ***
4 683 0.045 0.026 0.019 2.99 *** 424 0.097 0.043 0.054 3.73 *** 0.035 2.54 **
5 546 0.047 0.039 0.008 1.29 341 0.116 0.045 0.071 3.81 *** 0.063 3.72 ***
Panel B: IPO firms vs. private firms
No. of obs. IPO firms
Matched-
private firms





Period (t ) [a] [b] [c] (= [a] − [b]) [d] [e] [f] (= [d] − [e])
−3 1,003 0.128 0.074 0.055 7.46 *** 304 0.423 0.000 0.422 16.25 *** 0.368 18.82 ***
−2 978 0.139 0.067 0.072 9.83 *** 364 0.465 0.020 0.445 19.04 *** 0.373 20.07 ***
−1 986 0.125 0.061 0.064 9.67 *** 447 0.391 0.109 0.282 15.62 *** 0.218 13.93 ***
0 1,008 0.084 0.073 0.011 1.81 * 479 0.355 0.096 0.259 16.62 *** 0.248 18.11 ***
1 898 0.077 0.050 0.027 5.45 *** 470 0.280 0.048 0.232 14.56 *** 0.205 15.24 ***
2 807 0.066 0.043 0.023 3.89 *** 455 0.183 0.064 0.119 7.49 *** 0.096 6.76 ***
3 765 0.049 0.035 0.014 2.67 *** 422 0.121 0.075 0.046 2.90 *** 0.032 2.30 **
4 683 0.045 0.039 0.006 0.94 370 0.111 0.065 0.046 2.74 *** 0.040 2.61 ***
5 546 0.047 0.035 0.012 1.84 * 298 0.135 0.088 0.047 2.22 ** 0.035 1.95 *
t- statistics t- statistics
t- statistics
[g] (= [f] − [c])
Pre-deregulations Post-deregulations Post − Pre
Pre-deregulations Post-deregulations Post − Pre




Table Appendix A Listing requirements for the TSE and the Other Exchanges for Emerging Companies 
This table reports the listing requirements of the major stock markets for which modified requirements were established after 1999. The second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) 
was established in 1961 and the listing requirements were modified in 2000. Mothers is the stock market created by the TSE. NASDAQ is the stock market jointly created by the Osaka Stock 
Exchanges (OSE) and Softbank. JASDAQ was an over the counter (OTC) market and was reorganized into a stock market that was renamed JASDAQ. Centrex is the stock market created by 
the Nagoya Stock Exchange. 
 
 






Established in 2000 11/1999 05/2000 in 2000 10/1999
Net assets
At least 1 billion yen on a
consolidated basis and a positive
figure on a unconsolidated basis in
latest fiscal year end
No requirement More than 400 million yen No requirement No requirement
Profits
a. Two fiscal years age
At least 400 million yen in latest
fiscal year and 100 million yen, or
b. Three fiscal years ago
At least 400 million yen in latest
fiscal year, 100 million yen and a
total of 600 million yen over latest
three years
No requirement More than 75 million yen No requirement No requirement
Market value More than 2 billion yen More than 500 million yen at IPO More than 5 billion yen More than 500 million yen at IPO More than 500 million yen at IPO





Fig. 1 Comparing of productivity between IPO firms and private firms at pre and post deregulation period 
The figures plot the distributions of the level of TFP of IPO firms at three years prior to their IPOs (the solid line) and that of private firms (the broken line). The left graph plots the levels of 
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Fig. 5 IPO firm size by year  
 
